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Regulating Software When Everything
Has Software
Paul Ohm* and Blake Reid†
ABSTRACT
This Article identifies a profound, ongoing shift in the modern adminis-
trative state: from the regulation of things to the regulation of code.  This shift
has and will continue to place previously isolated agencies in an increasing
state of overlap, raising the likelihood of inconsistent regulations and putting
seemingly disparate policy goals, like privacy, safety, environmental protec-
tion, and copyright enforcement, in tension.  This Article explores this prob-
lem through a series of case studies and articulates a taxonomy of code
regulations to help place hardware-turned-code rules in context.  The Article
considers the likely turf wars, regulatory thickets, and related dynamics that
are likely to arise, and closes by considering the benefits of creating a new
agency with some degree of centralized authority over software regulation
issues.
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INTRODUCTION
2015 may someday be viewed as a major inflection point in the
regulation of software in the United States.  In that year, agencies that
traditionally had very little to say about code and coders suddenly be-
came aggressive regulators of code, from the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (“EPA”) to the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
to the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”).1  From the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”), we witnessed an agency with
a long history of regulating the telecommunications infrastructure
claw its way up the Open Systems Interconnection (“OSI”) layer
stack, focusing more than it had before on what happens at the Oper-
ating System and app layers and doing so in the way it regulated infor-
mation privacy and wireless interference.2  Legacy code-regulating
agencies from the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) to the Copyright Office stepped up their
activity in this space.3
This is not simply a story of agency mission creep and turf war-
fare, although that is part of the tale.  This is, instead, the inevitable
result of embedding software in everything.  Physical functionality has
been supplemented and replaced by code, thus digitizing the opera-
tion of everything from cars to thermostats to medical research.4
Agencies and regulators had to respond, whether or not they wanted
to.  Some have embraced the job eagerly while others have been drag-
ged into grappling with the digital age.  For both groups, 2015 seemed
to be the year that many realized that to regulate commerce, public
1 For case studies, see infra Section I.C.
2 See infra Section I.A.
3 See infra Part I.
4 See infra Part I.
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safety, consumer protection, or any number of other areas is also to
regulate code.5
In this Article, we begin to examine the implications of this shift.
Our examination puts the coder (and many species thereof—the tin-
kerer,6 the maker, the software engineer) at the center.  The first task
is to document the spread of code regulation, so we start with two
notable case studies from 2015, with one telling the story of the FCC’s
attempts to regulate software-defined radios and the other detailing
the year the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)7 triennial
review finally exploded well-beyond its original framing.8  Synthesiz-
ing these examples, we create a taxonomy of code regulation, one we
think can be used as a framework for organizing and analyzing discus-
sions over the regulation of code.9
Our first claim is that coders will begin to encounter a regulation
thicket, borrowing a concept from patent scholarship.10  Given the in-
trinsic malleability of code, every coding endeavor will implicate a
growing number of regulations, subjecting coders to a complex and
entangled set of requirements, prohibitions, and obligations.
Our second claim is that agencies will run headlong into new con-
flicts with other agencies and with newly uncovered jurisdictional
overlaps involving software, thus surfacing unresolved tensions and
competing policy priorities.11  For example, in 2015, privacy law watch-
ers fretted about collisions between the FCC and FTC as the FCC
began to expand its privacy enforcement activity.  The FTC reclassi-
fied telecommunications systems (subject to privacy regulations) to in-
clude broadband internet service providers, treading onto ground
cultivated and firmly held by the FCC.12  A Memorandum of Under-
5 See infra Section I.D.
6 By “tinkerer,” we mean a person who might traditionally have studied, taken apart,
tweaked, and reassembled hardware systems in a hobbyist or professional capacity and who
might now undertake the same or similar tasks with code.
7 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
8 See infra Section I.C.
9 See infra Part II.
10 Cf. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Stan-
dard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds.,
2000).  For our discussion of the regulation thicket, see infra Section III.A.
11 See infra Section III.B.
12 See Jedidiah Bracy, FTC Officials Concerned About Jurisdiction After FCC Net Neutral-
ity Order, IAPP: THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (Mar. 10, 2015), https://iapp.org/news/a/ftc-officials-
concerned-about-jurisdiction-after-fcc-net-neutrality-order/ [https://perma.cc/6TBP-LAAT]. See
generally Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 15-16585, 2016 WL 4501685 (9th Cir.
Aug. 29, 2016).
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standing13 between enforcers in the two agencies ended the immediate
hand-wringing, but its vague and open language raised questions
about whether the Memorandum is less a peace treaty and more a
cease-fire in this turf war.14
We offer a few prescriptions about how to deal with the problems
that might arise from the increased regulation of code.  We think the
federal government should consider a centralized approach to at least
some of the questions of code regulation.  Perhaps a single agency—
already in existence or yet to be created—can track and coordinate
the regulation of code across the government as well as confront the
new challenges posed by the transition of regulating software-based
objects.  It might also help agencies speak with one voice on difficult
and recurring questions that might arise, such as how to define author-
ization or how to incorporate software design principles into solutions.
At a bare minimum, the government might anticipate foreseeable
conflicts and conceive of procedural mechanisms to resolve them.
Our analysis proceeds in four parts.  Part I documents parallel
shifts from hardware to software and from regulating things to regu-
lating code, then explains why this shift matters.  Part II offers a tax-
onomy for code regulation.  Part III highlights problems that might
arise from the shift.  And finally, Part IV offers an argument for cen-
tralizing some (but not all) aspects of code regulation.
I. FROM REGULATING HARDWARE TO SOFTWARE
Regulators who regulate hardware today will regulate software
tomorrow because various industrial and economic trends are con-
verting much activity from hardware to software.  In this Part, we ex-
plore some root causes and empirical evidence of this shift.  We then
recount a pair of case studies from 2015 that heralded the shift.  This
shift matters, however, only if the distinction between hardware and
software matters, and we point to a few reasons to believe that it does.
13 FCC-FTC Consumer Protection Memorandum of Understanding (Nov. 16, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cooperation_agreements/151116ftcfcc-mou.pdf.
14 See, e.g., Margaret Harding McGill, Collaboration, Not Rivalry, Key in New FTC-FCC
Pact, LAW360 (Nov. 19, 2015, 1:44 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/728987/collaboration-
not-rivalry-key-in-new-ftc-fcc-pact [https://perma.cc/KR6V-KPZB] (indicating that the agencies
will endeavor to coordinate, but may both still exercise authority over the same matter when
there is overlap).
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A. Atoms to Bits
While law and policy often embed assumptions about whether a
particular problem will be solved with hardware or software, com-
puter scientists advance the “Principle of Equivalence of Hardware
and Software.”15  Put simply, any computational task can be solved
using either hardware or software or a combination of the two.16
Where hardware ends and software begins in any given system de-
pends on economic choices about the availability and allocation of re-
sources, such as manufacturing, expertise, and other systems that may
serve as foundations, not solely on the nature of the problem being
solved.17
A society-wide and rapid shift is occurring from consumer goods,
machines, and other devices implemented with noncomputational
hardware to similar devices where hardware functionality is supple-
mented with, or in some cases entirely replaced by, software.  Any
system that embeds logic, broadly defined, is a candidate for a shift
from hardware to software.  Such systems range from the mechanical
systems of an automobile to the diagnostics systems in medical devices
and beyond.  This matters to regulation only if there is something dif-
ferent about the regulation of hardware or software, a topic addressed
in Section I.E.  For now, consider some empirical evidence for this
shift, some potential root causes, and the way this relates to the rise of
the so-called Internet of Things.18
B. Understanding the Shift
Economists Mikko Packalen and Jay Bhattacharya elegantly sum-
marize an important shift in American innovation: the shift from “at-
oms to bits.”19  The pair studies “new idea inputs” in invention by
analyzing the text found in granted American patents, sorting these
ideas by decade.20  The early decades of the twentieth century are
15 LINDA NULL & JULIA LOBUR, THE ESSENTIALS OF COMPUTER ORGANIZATION AND
ARCHITECTURE 3 (2003).
16 Id.
17 See id. at 2.
18 See infra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. R
19 See Derek Thompson, “From Atoms to Bits:” A Brilliant Visual History of American
Ideas, ATLANTIC (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/02/a-short-his
tory-of-american-invention/385279/ [https://perma.cc/SU96-6GPJ]; Mikko Packalen & Jay Bhat-
tacharya, New Ideas in Invention 4–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
20922, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20922.pdf.
20 Packalen & Bhattacharya, supra note 19, at 5–6, Tbl. 1. R
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dominated by electrical and chemical ideas.21  In the 1910s, for exam-
ple, the five leading terms were “catalyst,” “capacitance,” “aircraft,”
“radio frequency,” and “automotive.”22  The 1980s is the decade of
computer hardware, drugs, and medical ideas, spurring terms “EEP-
ROM,” “hard disk drive,” “network LAN,” “laptop,” “area network,”
“DNA sequence,” “monoclonal antibodies,” “expression vectors,”
and “gene expression.”23  But by the first decade of the twenty-first
century, the twenty most popular new idea inputs all related to com-
puters and communications, including “bluetooth,” “markup lan-
guage,” “VoIP,” “storage area network,” and “instant messaging.”24
The results this study demonstrates for American invention have
also happened to American regulation.  Where once we regulated
mechanical objects or chemical reactions, we now regulate informa-
tion systems that reach the same results.  We do not mean analogically
similar things; we mean precisely the same thing.
For example, wireless communication functionality was once per-
formed by dedicated transmission and receiving devices—purpose-
built by manufacturers and tightly regulated by the FCC—but is now
performed by programmable, software-defined radios that can be con-
figured for a variety of purposes—including some illegal purposes that
were architecturally excluded when the FCC needed only to contend
with regulating the manufacture of hardware.25  Environmental pollu-
tion controls for automobiles, originally realized through devices
physically installed on vehicles, are now realized through complex
rules and algorithms built into software that controls the operation of
modern engines.26  Even medical devices like insulin controls and
pacemakers increasingly have their operations controlled by
software—so their safety features, too, must now rely on
programming.27
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 See generally Friedrich K. Jondral, Software-Defined Radio—Basics and Evolution to
Cognitive Radio, 3 EURASIP J. ON WIRELESS COMM. & NETWORKING 275 (2005) (providing an
overview of the development of software-defined radio systems).
26 See Robert Wall, How Car Software Can Rig a Test; A Complex Mix of Sensors, Engine-
Management Software Track Emissions, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2015, 12:24 PM), http://www.wsj
.com/articles/auto-software-in-focus-after-volkswagen-flap-1442945494 [https://perma.cc/9G59-
8DLZ].
27 Tom Haigh & Carl Landwehr, Building Code for Medical Device Software Security,
IEEE CYBERSECURITY 4–6 (2015), http://www.computer.org/cms/CYBSI/docs/BCMDSS.pdf.
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What is causing the shift from hardware to software?  A complete
account is beyond the scope and purpose of this Article, but consider
one important root cause: the rise of the “end-user microprocessor.”
As recently as a decade ago, putting brains into a physical device re-
quired a set of esoteric skills.28  Microprocessors—computer-process-
ing chips—often required expensive special hardware to program and
design, which limited the number of people who could do so.29  The
microprocessors available were underpowered, too large to squeeze
into small consumer devices, and required many ancillary components
to operate.30  Advances in chip design enabled manufacturers to cre-
ate more powerful and more self-contained processing onto a single
chip and allowed them to do so for a fraction of the earlier cost.31  This
gave rise to “system on a chip” designs and new microprocessor sys-
tems such as the Arduino and Raspberry Pi.32
Today, it is very easy and relatively inexpensive to build a device
with these systems.  What once required an EEPROM burner, logic
analyzer, and special training (not to mention a soldering iron) now
can be done with a personal computer, a USB cable, and easy-to-use
computer programming languages.33  This dovetailed with, or maybe
even helped give rise to, the Maker movement, which emphasizes do-
it-yourself construction of electronics and other engineering pursuits.34
The shift from hardware to software has given rise to the so-
called Internet of Things.35  A defining characteristic of the Internet of
Things is the proliferation of microprocessors into the physical world,
where they run code.36  At this current moment in time, the race is on
28 See Kenneth Leung, A History of the Arduino Microcontroller 3–4 WWW.KENLEUNG.CA,
http://www.kenleung.ca/_portfolioassets/PDF/HistoryOfArduino_KenLeung.pdf.
29 See id. at 2.
30 See id.
31 See id. at 3.
32 See id.
33 See Evgeny Morozov, Making It, NEW YORKER (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.newyorker
.com/magazine/2014/01/13/making-it-2 [https://perma.cc/PT92-4RLB].
34 Id.
35 See Julie Brill, The Internet of Things: Building Trust and Maximizing Benefits Through
Consumer Control, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 205, 205–08 (2014); Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without
Screens & the Internet of Other People’s Things, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 639, 641–42 (2015); Scott R.
Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy,
Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 88–89 (2014); see also FTC, INTERNET OF THINGS:
PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD, STAFF REPORT 5–6 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-work-
shop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf.
36 FTC, supra note 35, at 5 (surveying definitions of “Internet of Things” but noting that R
“there is still no widely accepted definition”).
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to stick these microprocessors into everything, from refrigerators to
clothing to humans.37
Many of the devices now being equipped with microprocessors
have historically been the subject of regulatory measures, which have
had laudable goals—facilitating safety, preventing injury, ensuring se-
curity, reducing energy consumption and pollution, preventing wire-
less interference, and so forth.  But these regulatory measures,
previously targeted at devices themselves, must now directly contend
with the software that operates the devices.
C. Case Studies
Consider the following two case studies that demonstrate the shift
from hardware to software.  The FCC’s statutory instruction to police
wireless spectrum interference formerly involved devices made of
hardware (transmitters and receivers) for the most part but today
often involves the regulation of software-defined radio.38  Similarly,
the most recent DMCA triennial review, completed in 2015, involved
software-enabled devices in a breathtakingly large range of industrial
activity, from cars and tractors to insulin pumps.39  The latest review
also drew in an eclectic cast of government agencies weighing in on
(and perhaps weighing down) the process for the first time.40
1. The FCC Meets Open Firmware
Congress has long empowered the FCC to regulate wireless spec-
trum interference.  This power is embodied in section 333 of the Com-
munications Act of 1934,41 which currently provides: “[n]o person
shall willfully or maliciously interfere with or cause interference to
any radio communications of any station licensed or authorized by or
under this chapter or operated by the United States Government.”42
Before recent developments, policing section 333 meant policing
hardware.  People interfered with wireless bands allocated to another
person or entity primarily by building homemade radios configured in
37 Peppet, supra note 35, at 88; see also Brill, supra note 35, at 206–07. R
38 See Julius Knapp, Securing RF Devices Amid Changing Technology, FCC BLOG (Oct. 8,
2015, 3:56 PM), https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2015/10/08/securing-rf-devices-amid-
changing-technology [https://perma.cc/5762-PUBD].
39 See infra notes 72–75. R
40 USCO Letters to Other Agencies, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://copyright.gov/1201/
2015/USCO-letters/ [https://perma.cc/Z2NS-YH4C] (last visited Oct. 3, 2016) (collecting letters
both to and from other agencies during section 1201 review).
41 47 U.S.C. § 333 (2012).
42 Id.
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a way that produced an interfering signal.43  A complementary statute,
section 302a(a),44 affords the FCC the ability to promulgate
regulations:
(1) governing the interference potential of devices which in
their operation are capable of emitting radio frequency en-
ergy by radiation, conduction, or other means in sufficient
degree to cause harmful interference to radio communica-
tions; and (2) establishing minimum performance standards
for home electronic equipment and systems to reduce their
susceptibility to interference from radio frequency energy.
Such regulations shall be applicable to the manufacture, im-
port, sale, offer for sale, or shipment of such devices and
home electronic equipment and systems, and to the use of
such devices.45
The rise of so-called software-defined radio (“SDR”), however,
changed wireless interference into a software game.  An SDR is a
hardware device designed to be able to be reconfigured quickly and
using software alone.46  With SDR, a user can use software to change,
among other things, the frequency bands on which an SDR transmits
and receives and the power output of its transmissions.47  Each of
these changes can raise the prospect of seamless and widespread new
interference to other spectrum users.
Following the rise of SDRs, the question of how the FCC would
adapt its section 333 responsibility came to a head with a document
released in March 2015 by the FCC’s Office of Engineering and Tech-
nology, Laboratory Division entitled Software Security Requirements
for U-NII Devices.48  U-NII stands for “Unlicensed National Informa-
tion Infrastructure” and refers to devices that operate in the unli-
43 See e.g., Jammer Enforcement, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/general/jammer-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/ZE4F-4BD4] (last visited Oct. 3, 2016); see also Thomas H. White, Building the
Broadcast Band, U.S. EARLY RADIO HIST. (June 7, 2008), http://earlyradiohistory.us/buildbcb
.htm.
44 47 U.S.C. § 302a(a).
45 Id.
46 FCC Rules on FOSS and Software-Defined Radio, SOFTWARE FREEDOM L. CTR., § 2.1
(July 6, 2007), https://www.softwarefreedom.org/resources/2007/fcc-sdr-whitepaper.html; see
also, e.g., Gregory Staple & Kevin Werbach, The End of Spectrum Scarcity, IEEE SPECTRUM
(Mar. 1, 2004, 3:16 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/wireless/the-end-of-spectrum-scarcity
[https://perma.cc/J9HW-6HQE].
47 FCC Rules on FOSS and Software-Defined Radio, supra note 46. R
48 FCC Office of Eng’g & Tech. Lab. Div., Software Security Requirements for U-NII De-
vices (Mar. 18, 2015), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2339685/fcc-software-security-
requirements.pdf [hereinafter March FCC Memo].
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censed 5 GHz band, which includes some Wi-Fi routers.49  The short
memo discusses the need for devices operating in this band to
“reduc[e] the potential for harmful interference to authorized users”
and its significant attendant consequences.50
The problem is that a community of programmers, tinkerers, and
users has arisen around wireless routers, which are merely low-end
computers with useful and specialized networking hardware built-in.51
Two notable efforts are the DD-WRT52 and OpenWRT53 groups, both
of which consist of coders creating new versions of the operating sys-
tem for certain routers that include various types of increased
functionality.54
Many in the community saw the March 2015 memo as a shot
across their bow.55  In fact, the memo lists DD-WRT by name, in-
structing router manufacturers to “[d]escribe in detail how the device
is protected from . . . the installation of third-party firmware such as
DD-WRT.”56  While the FCC clarified that it was intending to address
only the impacts of the software on interference, the community saw it
as a broader intrusion into their ability to tinker with all the software
on the router, including applying security patches, enhancing function-
ality, and so forth.57
After public outcry, the FCC responded by amending the March
2015 memo in November 2015.58  The revised memo deletes some of
the sentences that most concerned the community, namely, those
which sought to require manufacturers to “prevent third parties from
loading [certain] versions of the software/firmware on the device” and
49 Id. at 1.
50 Id.
51 Bradley Mitchell, Router, ABOUT TECH., http://compnetworking.about.com/cs/routers/g/
bldef_router.htm (last updated Oct. 3, 2016).
52 DD-WRT Privacy: Regain Your Internet Freedom, DD-WRT.COM, http://www.dd-wrt
.com/site/dd-wrt_privacy [https://perma.cc/J6TY-F4UQ] (last visited Aug. 7, 2016).
53 What is OpenWrt?, OPENWRT, http://openwrt.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
54 See supra notes 52–53. R
55 Jon Brodkin, FCC: We Aren’t Banning DD-WRT on Wi-Fi Routers, ARS TECHNICA
(Nov. 12, 2015, 1:50 PM), http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/11/fcc-we-arent-
banning-dd-wrt-on-wi-fi-routers/ [https://perma.cc/6V9J-W788]; Rob Marvin, FCC Fires Wi-Fi
Router Salvo in Battle of DRM vs. Open Source, PCMAG.COM (Sept. 2, 2015, 1:10 PM), http://
www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2490525,00.asp [https://perma.cc/Q7RG-LV7C].
56 March FCC Memo, supra note 48, at 2. R
57 See Brodkin, supra note 55. R
58 FCC Office of Eng’g & Tech. Lab. Div., Software Security Requirements for U-NII De-
vices (Nov. 12, 2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/kdb/GetAttachment.html?id=zXtrctoj6zH7oNEOO6
De6g%3D%3D&desc=594280%20D02%20U-NII%20Device%20Security%20v01r03&tracking
_number=39498 [hereinafter November FCC Memo].
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those singling out DD-WRT as a specific example.59  In their place, it
asks device manufacturers to
[d]escribe, if the device permits third-party software or
firmware installation, what mechanisms are provided by the
manufacturer to permit integration of such functions while
ensuring that the RF parameters of the device cannot be op-
erated outside its authorization for operation in the U.S.  In
the description include what controls and/or agreements are
in place with providers of third-party functionality to ensure
the devices’ underlying RF parameters are unchanged and
how the manufacturer verifies the functionality.60
This new language accomplishes two important goals.  First, it
abandons the implicit advice about “prevent[ing]” third-party
firmware to a more neutral one of acknowledging that some manufac-
turers might permit third-party firmware (but it perhaps disappoints
those who wanted the FCC to go further and affirmatively encourage
open hardware instead).  Second, the new memo focuses on “RF pa-
rameters” as the sole area of concern for the FCC, implying that
firmware developers can let their users configure other aspects of
their software.61
This case study exemplifies one dynamic that can result from the
shift from hardware to software: the unintended consequences of ap-
plying hardware-specific regulations to software that will likely inter-
act with those regulations in new and unpredictable ways.
2. The 2015 DMCA Triennial Review
The 2014–2015 triennial review of exemptions to section 1201 of
the DMCA conducted by the Library of Congress and U.S. Copyright
Office ultimately found that users, coders, tinkerers, researchers, man-
ufacturers, the Copyright Office, the EPA, the FDA, and the National
Telecommunications & Information Administration (“NTIA”) are
locked in a battle over the legality of tinkering with, hacking, and re-
searching cars, tractors, planes, voting machines, cryptography sys-
tems, electronic baby toys, and more.  How did a statute ostensibly
focused on copyright lead to such a result?
First, some background on section 1201.  The statue was origi-
nally designed to help facilitate the secure distribution of digital con-
tent—mainly video programming—by making it illegal to circumvent
59 See March FCC Memo, supra note 48, at 2. R
60 November FCC Memo, supra note 58, at 2–3. R
61 Id.
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digital locks (popularly, “digital rights management” (“DRM”) or in
the statute’s parlance, “technological protection measures”
(“TPMs”)) on that content or to develop and distribute tools to do
so.62  However, section 1201 makes illegal the circumvention of (and
the development and distribution of tools for circumventing) TPMs
placed on any copyrighted work—including computer software.63
Thus, as computer software has pervaded more and more every-
day devices over the past two decades, section 1201 has increasingly
become viewed by some not simply as a narrow copyright statute, but
as a more general statute regulating the circumvention of computer
code with security features.64  This development has occurred organi-
cally and without specific legislative or administrative intervention.
This is because section 1201 regulates circumvention and tool devel-
opment and distribution by default, leaving consideration of tempo-
rary (three-year) exemptions to a triennial review conducted by the
Library of Congress and the Copyright Office.65
During each triennial review, the Copyright Office reviews a vari-
ety of proposals from various stakeholders to grant exemptions for
circumvention under certain circumstances and therefore must effec-
tively make a decision about whether to continue banning circumven-
tion in those contexts.66  During the 2014–2015 review, a flurry of
exemption requests were submitted involving computer code:
• A cohort of “unlocking” exemptions, aimed at permitting mod-
ifying baseband firmware on smartphones, tablets, and other
devices to move them from one cellular network to another.67
• Several “jailbreaking” exemptions, aimed at modifying locks
on smartphones, ebook readers, video game consoles, smart
TVs, and other devices to install applications not approved by
the devices’ manufacturers.68
62 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)–(b) (2012).
63 See id. §§ 102, 1201(a)–(b).
64 See Parker Higgins, EFF to Congress: Get Rid of DMCA’s “Anti-Circumvention” Provi-
sions, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/09/eff-con-
gress-get-rid-dmcas-anti-circumvention-provisions [https://perma.cc/4W9P-UUGZ].
65 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)–(D).
66 See id.
67 See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 79 Fed. Reg. 73,856 (proposed Dec. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 201) [hereinafter Exemption to Prohibition]; see also, e.g., Competitive Carriers Asso-
ciation, Petition for Proposed Exemption Under 17 U.S.C. § 1201, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LI-
BRARY OF CONG., http://copyright.gov/1201/2014/petitions/Competitive_Carriers_Association_3_
1201_Initial_Submission_2014.pdf.
68 See Exemption to Prohibition, supra note 67; see also, e.g., Comments of Electronic R
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• A pair of exemptions focused on circumvention of TPMs on
software installed on vehicles, including both cars and farm
equipment—one for security and safety research and the other
for diagnosis, repair, or modification.69
• An exemption focused on circumvention of TPMs on software
for networked medical devices, such as insulin pumps, aimed at
both safety and security and allowing patients to extract health
data about themselves.70
• Several proposed exemptions around security research on a va-
riety of computer systems.71
The proposed vehicle, medical, and computer security exemp-
tions prompted extensive discussion during the rulemaking around
policy matters bearing little relation to copyright law.  For example:
• The vehicle exemptions prompted discussion around the extent
to which the modification of vehicle software could result in
violations of the EPA’s emissions standards and various traffic
safety laws.72
• The medical exemption prompted discussion around the extent
to which accessing the software on medical devices was consis-
tent with the FDA’s regulation of the cybersecurity of medical
devices and health privacy law.73
Frontier Foundation and Organization for Transformative Works, Docket No. 2014-07, before
the U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Cong., http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments-
020615/InitialComments_LongForm_EFFOTW_Class07.pdf.
69 See Exemption to Prohibition, supra note 67; see also, e.g., Elec. Frontier Found., Ex- R
emption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies, Docket No. 2014-07, before the U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Cong., http://
copyright.gov/1201/2014/petitions/Electronic_Frontier_Foundation_1201_Initial_Submission_20
14.pdf.
70 See Exemption to Prohibition, supra note 67; see also, e.g., Berkman Ctr. for Internet & R
Soc’y, Petition of a Coalition of Medical Device Researchers for Exemption to Prohibition of
Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, Docket No.
2014-07, before the U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Cong., http://copyright.gov/1201/2014/peti-
tions/Berkman_Center_1201_Initial_Submission_2014.pdf.
71 See Exemption to Prohibition, supra note 67; see also, e.g., Matthew Green, Short Com- R
ment Regarding a Proposed Exemption Under 17 U.S.C. 1201, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LI-
BRARY OF CONG., http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments-020615/InitialComments_short
form_MGreen_Class22.pdf.
72 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONG., SIXTH TRIENNIAL 1201 RULEMAKING
HEARINGS 26, 35, 144 (May 26, 2015); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECTION 1201
RULEMAKING: SIXTH TRIENNIAL PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE EXEMPTIONS TO THE PROHIBI-
TION ON CIRCUMVENTION: RECOMMENDATION OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 267 (2015)
[hereinafter U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RECOMMENDATION OF THE REGISTER].
73 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONG., supra note 72, at 33–36, 133–34, 144; see R
also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RECOMMENDATION OF THE REGISTER, supra note 72, at 276. R
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• The security exemption prompted discussion around the extent
to which security research might pose risks to public safety—
including a recent episode involving hacking of an airplane’s
avionics system—or inspire violations of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (“CFAA”),74 and also included discussion re-
garding the appropriate policy for requiring researchers to re-
port security risks to responsible companies before reporting
them to the public.75
Ignoring pleas from exemption proponents to stay focused on
copyright policy issues, the Copyright Office took the unprecedented
step of soliciting feedback on the exemptions from the EPA, the FDA,
the Department of Transportation (“DOT”), and the National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”).76  The responses
varied:
• The EPA urged the Copyight Office to deny the vehicle exemp-
tions on the grounds that they would facilitate the practice of
modifying vehicles to exceed the emissions limits in the Clean
Air Act.77
• The DOT expressed concern that the vehicle exemptions could
facilitate violations of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act and thus urged the Copyright Office to adopt disclo-
sure limitations on information gleaned from vehicle security
research that is enabled by the vehicle security exemption.78
• The FDA took a less aggressive view, urging the Copyright Of-
fice to make clear that an exemption from section 1201 would
not affect obligations of circumventors under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.79
74 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
75 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONG., supra note 72, at 125–51; see also U.S. R
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RECOMMENDATION OF THE REGISTER, supra note 72, at 312–15. R
76 USCO Letters to Other Agencies, supra note 40 (collecting letters both to and from R
other agencies during § 1201 review).
77 Letter from Geoff Cooper, Assistant General Counsel, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency,
to Jacqueline C. Charlesworth, General Counsel and Associate Register of Copyrights, U.S.
Copyright Office, Library of Cong. (July 17, 2015) (http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/USCO-letters/
EPA_Letter_to_USCO_re_1201.pdf).
78 Letter from Kathryn B. Thomson, General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., to Jacque-
line C. Charlesworth, General Counsel and Associate Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright
Office, Library of Cong. (Sept. 9, 2015) (http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/USCO-letters/DOT_Let
ter_to_USCO_re_1201.pdf).
79 Letter from Bakul Patel, Associate Dir. for Digital Health Ctr. for Devices and Radio-
logical Health, Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Jacqueline C.
Charlesworth, General Counsel and Associate Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office,
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Suddenly, the Copyright Office found itself at the center of a full-
fledged, multiagency debate over the extent to which code regulation
might be necessary not just for copyright policy reasons, but for envi-
ronmental, traffic, health, and various other noncopyright policy rea-
sons as well.80
The NTIA, with which section 1201 obliges the Copyright Office
to consult in considering exemptions,81 blasted the Office for going
too far.82  The NTIA noted that the triennial review had “stood out
for its extensive discussions of matters with no or at best a very tenu-
ous nexus to copyright protection,” and criticized the Office for trying
to “develop expertise in every area of policy that participants may cite
on the record.”83  The NTIA urged the Office not to “heavily weigh
unrelated matters such as greenhouse gas emissions or the quality of
materials used to build aircraft, and . . . instead [to] focus primarily on
questions relevant to copyright law,” noting that “Congress, applica-
ble regulatory agencies, and their counterparts within state govern-
ments are well-equipped to deal with these non-copyright issues in the
appropriate settings and under legal authorities focused on those
issues.”84
This case study exemplifies a different dynamic from the FCC/
SDR example: the complex and interconnected suite of policy issues,
values, and law that will often arise when an agency tries to regulate
hardware that has shifted to incorporate software.
D. Looking Ahead
We think that the FCC/SDR and DMCA examples are just the
beginning.  With every passing year, and as more human and indus-
trial activity shifts from hardware to software, more government agen-
cies will find themselves pressed—some willingly, some kicking and
screaming—into regulating software.  Consider only a few additional
Library of Cong. (Aug. 18, 2015) (http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/USCO-letters/FDA_Letter_to_
USCO_re_1201.pdf).
80 See USCO Letters to Other Agencies, supra note 40; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RECOM- R
MENDATION OF THE REGISTER, supra note 72, at 312–15. R
81 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2012).
82 See Letter from Lawrence E. Strickling, Assistant Sec. for Commc’ns & Info., Nat’l
Telecomm. & Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, to Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copy-
rights, Library of Cong., attachment at 5 (Sept. 18, 2015), http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/
2015_NTIA_Letter.pdf [hereinafter NTIA Letter].
83 Id. at 3–4.
84 Id. at 5.
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examples from 2015 that demonstrate the increasing engagement of
agencies with software.
EPA v. VW.  The revelation that Volkswagen had devised
software in millions of automobiles that could switch on environmen-
tal control systems only during emissions testing has already become a
centerpiece in debates over the regulability of code.85  We are sure
that this story will be retold and analyzed by legal scholars for years, if
not decades, to come.  We focus on it for only a small part of this
story: the EPA, an agency charged with understanding the intricacies
of catalytic converters, dynamometers, and other physical devices,
must now understand complex software processes that are integrated
with those physical devices.
FDA and Medical Devices. The FDA has long been charged with
ensuring the safety of medical devices, including those implanted in
patients, such as pacemakers and insulin pumps.86  However, those de-
vices have increasingly begun to include complex software stacks, such
as wireless networking protocols that raise serious concerns about the
security of those devices.87  This dynamic has led the FDA to regulate
the manufacturers of medical devices that include software and addi-
tionally to opine when others seek to interact with the code on de-
vices, including independent researchers and even patients.88
FAA and Drones. The FAA has, of course, regulated software
for decades.  Long before the Copyright Office or the FDA thought
about software, the FAA was worried about the software routines in
airplanes, airports, air traffic centers, and, beyond that, superintended
flight operations, safety, air traffic, and more.89
It still seems, however, that the FAA, despite its historical experi-
ence with software regulation, has seen a shift in focus, at least in de-
gree if not in kind.  Suddenly, the FAA has been asked to police
85 See, e.g., Megan Geuss, US Sues Volkswagen over Defeat Device Scandal, ARS
TECHNICA (Jan. 4, 2016, 3:25 PM), http://arstechnica.com/cars/2016/01/us-sues-volkswagen-over-
defeat-device-scandal/ [https://perma.cc/E3R5-23JD].
86 William H. Maisel, Medical Device Regulation: An Introduction for the Practicing Physi-
cian, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 296, 296 (2004).
87 See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDI-
CAL DEVICES: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
STAFF (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuid
ance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM482022.pdf.
88 Id.
89 See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg.
9544, 9544 (notice of proposed rulemaking Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43,
45, 47, 61, 91, 101, 107, 183).
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airspace abuzz (quite literally) with thousands of very cheap drones.90
Unlike the airplanes that have been the object of the FAA’s regula-
tory attention for a century, these devices are manufactured by small
start-up companies—including toy manufacturers—without a history
of regulatory scrutiny.  Moreover, they are being operated and modi-
fied by average citizens with no formal training.91
NHTSA and Connected Cars. One final example of an agency
suddenly forced to think about software in new ways is the NHTSA.
This small subagency within the DOT has been asked to investigate
software in automobiles—not only the consumer-facing interfaces in
connected cars, for example, but also in the systems controlling vehi-
cles themselves.92
E. Why This Matters
We think the shift from hardware to software matters because
agencies will find their traditional approaches to regulation at least
disrupted—if not entirely upended—when the object of their atten-
tion shifts.  This is a contestable claim, and we do not prove it here
definitively.  Whether regulating software is different in kind or
merely in degree from regulating hardware, and, if only in degree, the
size of the change, are questions that deserve to be studied in greater
depth than we present here.
In this Article, it will suffice to point to some reasons why the
hardware-to-software transition is important and difficult.  At the core
of the importance and difficulty is the fact that hardware and software
differ in several important ways.  Most importantly, software evolves
and changes more quickly than hardware.93  Jonathan Zittrain’s theory
of generativity explains why: software is easier to change and custom-
ize than hardware.94
90 Id.
91 See, e.g., Paul Stamatiou, Getting Started with Drones, PAULSTAMATIOU.COM (July 30,
2014), http://paulstamatiou.com/getting-started-with-drones-quadcopters/ [https://perma.cc/
M7PN-BZ2Y] (teaching beginners the basics of learning to use and modify drones).
92 NHTSA, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANS., FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY: ACCELER-
ATING THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN ROADWAY SAFETY (2016); Rachael King, Automakers Tackle
the Massive Security Challenges of Connected Vehicles, WALL ST. J. BLOG: CIO J. (June 25,
2015, 3:10 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/06/25/automakers-tackle-the-massive-security-chal-
lenges-of-connected-vehicles/ [https://perma.cc/KKW4-TPV8].
93 See JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 15
(2008) (noting that while a PC’s hardware does not change, the processing software may be
repeatedly upgraded or replaced).
94 Id.
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As the VW example highlights, software is also easier to obscure.
Software systems can be turned on or off through the simple applica-
tion of a few lines of code, in contrast to hardware systems that may
require cumbersome and visible physical modifications to facilitate
the same operation.95  Software code can be buried in binary code and
tamper-proof chips and can even be encrypted.96  While many regula-
tory regimes rest on the presumption that a system’s operation can be
observed and verified, verifying that complex computer code operates
in a particular way is both theoretically and practically difficult to per-
form at any degree of precision.97
For these reasons, we think the tools, personnel, and expertise
developed slowly by agencies since the rise of the industrial revolution
will not deal well with the software shift.  Unfortunately, the genera-
tivity and obscurability of software means that an agency must do
more than merely learn how to regulate software; the agency will
quickly learn that software is a moving target not necessarily suscepti-
ble to legacy regulations.  There are sure to be growing pains as agen-
cies realize that their old methods and expertise may no longer work
well, and there will be unintended consequences from the regulations
that result from these challenging circumstances.  In Part IV, we diag-
nose a few of these potential problems, and in Part V, consider a few
ways to avoid the worst of them.
II. A TAXONOMY OF CODE REGULATION
The regulation of software will take many different forms and tar-
get many different types of activity.  Accordingly, it might be useful to
lend some structure to software regulation, and in this Part we pro-
pose a taxonomy.  As with any such effort, we think there is more
than one way to organize the regulation of software, but we think the
taxonomy we have developed provides a straightforward framework,
one we will use to develop prescriptions in the final Part of this
Article.
Our taxonomy builds on three aspects of the laws we are consid-
ering.  First, and most importantly, we separate laws by the types of
activities engaged in by the people subject to the regulation, for exam-
ple, coding, tinkering, or using software.  Second, we look for distinc-
95 See id. at 4.
96 See id. at 248.
97 Yuji Kukimoto, Introduction to Formal Verification, DONALD O. PETERSON CTR. FOR
ELEC. SYSTEMS DESIGN (Feb. 6, 1996, 11:58 PM), https://embedded.eecs.berkeley.edu/research/
vis/doc/VisUser/vis_user/node4.html.
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tions by thinking about software system architecture.  Some laws
restrict their attention to particular points in the so-called network
layers model—for example, laws that focus on application developers
or infrastructure providers.98  Alternatively, some laws draw different
architectural lines, focusing, for example, on platforms or in-
termediaries.99  Third, and finally, we draw some lines based on the
manufacturing lifecycle of software, asking whether agencies should
intervene during initial software development, during deployment, or
in an after-market, post-manufacturing stage.  To put these three con-
siderations another way, we thought about the who, the where, and
the when of software regulation.
One virtue of our taxonomy is its simplicity.  We reduce software
regulation into four major categories based on the target of regula-
tion: coders, users, platforms, and security, with subcategories for the
latter two.  Despite the relatively few moving parts of this system, we
contend that virtually every regulation that could fall under the label
“software regulation” fits within one of these parts.
We also hope that the taxonomy’s framework can contribute to
the development of sound regulation.  The lines between the four cat-
egories and six subcategories will likely be the same lines regulators
will draw between approaches to regulation.  In other words, a law
regulating platforms will differ from one regulating coders in system-
atic and important ways.  Regulators will understand better how to
learn from other agencies using the taxonomy; they will be well-ad-
vised to pay closer attention to precedents from the same part of the
taxonomy in which they dwell, and they will understand that prece-
dents from across the taxonomy are less useful and perhaps irrelevant.
A. Coders
Our first category of software regulation focuses on coders.
These laws and regulations regulate software developers directly.  This
is often because lawmakers suspect that certain types of software cre-
ated by coders are likely to raise tricky or worrisome public policy
issues.
For example, coders can be regulated to stop them from creating
software deemed to infringe on copyrights in other software.  In Lotus
v. Borland,100 for example, the creators of Lotus 1-2-3 sued a competi-
98 See supra Part I.
99 See supra Part I.
100 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d per curiam, 516
U.S. 233 (1996).
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tor, Borland, for allegedly developing software that took too much
copyrighted expression.101
Another example is the law of export controls as applied to en-
cryption software.  Under the ITAR and its successors, the EAR and
the Wassenaar Arrangement, government agencies including the De-
partment of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security have scruti-
nized and sometimes blocked people from distributing software
containing certain “strong” forms of encryption and cybersecurity
software.102
B. Users
Many laws are directed at the users of software.  For purposes of
this taxonomy, we are distinguishing between software under the di-
rect control of a user, which fits in this category, and software distrib-
uted on a platform, which we place in the next major category.103
Again, copyright law provides many important examples.  The
lawsuits against users of peer-to-peer networks of the early 2000s are
prime examples.104  In addition to suing the developers who created—
and the corporations that hosted—services like Grokster, the record-
ing industry targeted individual downloaders as well.105  Another early
and important example is the case MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Com-
puter, Inc.,106 in which a computer repair firm was sued for using the
licensed software of its customers as a result of its repair activity.107
C. Platforms
Many laws focus on software distributed via platforms.  The deci-
sion to deliver software as services via the internet raises novel and
challenging issues of law and policy.  Within the platforms category,
we perceive at least three subcategories, which we are calling: Plat-
form/User, Platform/Platform, and Platform/Replacement.
101 Id. at 810.
102 Sean B. Hoar & Bryan Thompson, Pardon the “Intrusion”—Cybersecurity Worries Scut-
tle Wassenaar Changes, PRIVACY & SECURITY L. BLOG (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.privsecblog
.com/2015/09/articles/cyber-national-security/pardon-the-intrusion-cybersecurity-worries-scuttle-
wassenaar-changes/ [https://perma.cc/6QCT-9JD6].
103 This distinction is increasingly likely to erode, particularly as more software becomes
distributed via the cloud.
104 See generally Elec. Frontier Found., RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, EFF.ORG
(Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-whitepaper.pdf.
105 See id. § I.
106 MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
107 Id. at 517–19.
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1. Platform/User
Some regulations focus on the users of platforms.  Again, this cat-
egory overlaps with the unadorned Users category above.  We place
this activity in a separate category, however, because we find recur-
ring themes involving users of platforms that do not occur in earlier,
direct-control cases.
Again, these regulatory efforts focus on a user who uses software
in a disfavored way.  From copyright, for example, we have the raft of
notice-and-takedown actions brought against users of YouTube.108
Like the lawsuits against users of Grokster, these actions targeted in-
dividuals, but because of the role played by the owner of the platform,
there is more of a three-party dynamic at play—the content owner,
the platform, and the user—suggesting the need for a distinct part of
the taxonomy.
2. Platform/Platform
Rather than target the user of a platform, sometimes laws or reg-
ulations focus on the platform itself.  In rare cases, these efforts label
almost an entire platform as the site of unlawful activity; see, for ex-
ample, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.109 or the
actions against MegaUpload.110  In addition, cases against platforms
involve the notice-and-takedown provisions of the DMCA, which find
a regulatory lever in the third-party platform.111
A key issue arising in Platform/Platform cases is statutory immu-
nity, most importantly via section 230 of the Communications De-
cency Act.112  This provision affords immunity to various types of
platforms for illegal acts performed by platform users.113
3. Platform/Replacement
In recent years, regulatory attention has focused on a recurring
pattern, one that has received much less scholarly commentary.
108 E.g., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that
before sending a takedown notice, a copyright holder must consider the fair use doctrine in
forming a good-faith belief that use of copyrighted material constitutes infringement of the
copyright).
109 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
110 See Kim Zetter, Judge Rules Kim Dotcom Can Be Extradited to U.S. to Face Charges,
WIRED (Dec. 22, 2015, 5:50 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/12/kim-dotcom-extradition-ruling/
[https://perma.cc/N6G5-L3KQ].
111 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
112 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
113 See id.
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Sometimes, rather than using the entire platform developed by the
platform designer, a community of users will replace the upper
software layers of the platform with its own, custom-built software or
firmware.114  These users are able to do this by taking advantage of at
least three related phenomena: general purpose computing, the gener-
ativity of platforms, and layered design principles.
A hacker community has engaged in jailbreaking or rooting of
smartphones.115  Sometimes, this activity is restricted to removing
some of the security of these devices to enable the installation of
software outside the strictures of the official app store.116  In other
cases, a community will completely replace the entire operating sys-
tem of the phone, creating what seems like an entirely new product.117
In successive DMCA exemption proceedings, the Librarian of Con-
gress has granted exemptions for some forms of jailbreaking.118
Similarly, a separate community has focused on creating firmware
for embedded devices, most notably wireless routers.119  This is the
community that has raised eyebrows at the FCC, because they essen-
tially can reprogram the flexible radio hardware in these routers to
violate FCC interference laws.120
D. Security
The final category in our taxonomy is security.  Unlike the first
two categories, which focused on people (coders and users) and the
third major category, platforms, which focused on architecture, this
final category focuses on a recurring pattern of behavior.  Security is-
sues involve the designation of a protected/restricted “inside” of a
computer network or system and a disfavored/excluded “outside.”
Many laws and policies, including the CFAA, the DMCA, and the
HIPAA Security Rule,121 bolster technical methods for security by us-
ing legal or regulatory solutions.
114 See, e.g., Jenna Wortham, Unofficial Software Incurs Apple’s Wrath, N.Y. TIMES (May
12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/13/technology/13jailbreak.html.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Miguel Helft, Meet Cyanogen, the Startup That Wants to Steal Android from Google,
FORBES (March 23, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/miguelhelft/2015/03/23/meet-cy-
anogen-the-startup-that-wants-to-steal-android-from-google-2 [https://perma.cc/A6SA-CPUV].
118 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Ac-
cess Control Technologies, 80 Fed. Reg. 208, 65,944, 65,952 (Oct. 28, 2015) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 201).
119 See supra Section I.C.1.
120 See supra Section I.C.1.
121 45 C.F.R. § 160 (2007).
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As with the Platform category, we further subdivide Security into
three subcategories: Security/Hackers, Security/Researchers, and Se-
curity/Blackboxes.
1. Security/Hackers
Some laws are designed to prevent outsiders from gaining access
to a secured system.122  These laws target those outsiders—or hackers,
to follow the convention—by providing for legal sanction and other
tools to prevent, detect, and deter hackers.
The CFAA is the primary example.  It rests fundamentally on the
concept of authorization, a concept given exacting scrutiny in other
articles in this Symposium.123  Other examples include the provisions
of the DMCA that focus on users of circumvention tools and
techniques.124
2. Security/Researchers
Some laws focus not only on the end-users who ultimately breach
security but also on those who probe, research, or study a system,
often for the purpose of finding flaws in the security system.  Many of
these researchers aim to develop tools to empower other users to cir-
cumvent the security.
We recognize that in many cases the only thing that distinguishes
the hacker and the researcher is motive.  We are unapologetic about
this blurring, because we think that many important policy lines are
drawn along this same blurred border.  For example, many of the
DMCA exemptions that have been granted in the triennial review
process have turned on the status or motive of the person doing the
circumvention.125  Once again, both the DMCA and CFAA have been
used against researchers.126
122 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030; 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(b) (2012).
123 James Grimmelmann, Consenting to Computer Use, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1500
(2016); Josh Goldfoot & Aditya Bamzai, A Trespass Framework for the Crime of Hacking, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477 (2016).
124 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).
125 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Ac-
cess Control Technologies, 80 Fed. Reg. 208, 65,944, 65,952 (Oct. 28, 2015) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 201) (“Proposed Classes 16 and 17: Jailbreaking—Smartphones and All-Purpose Mo-
bile Computing Devices”).
126 Matthew D. Green, Long-Form Comment: Proposed Class 25: Security Research,
Docket No. 2014-07, before the U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Cong., at 18 http://copyright
.gov/1201/2015/comments-020615/InitialComments_LongForm_Green_Class25.pdf.
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3. Security/Blackbox
Finally, some software regulation puts the regulator in the role of
the circumventer or user.  In these situations, the regulator desires to
peer into the inner-workings of a complex system, and they are
thwarted by security measures.127  In many ways, these regulators are
like the hacker facing a secure network or a copyright user facing
DRM.  They have been deemed “outsiders” by the security system,
and they are attempting to find their way into the inside, at least for a
peek.
Volkswagen’s attempts to thwart scrutiny by environmental regu-
lators are the best example to date of this form of software regula-
tion.128  In this example, environmental regulators were required in an
enforcement posture to verify the operation of emission controls on
Volkswagen’s vehicles to determine whether they were operating
properly.129
III. IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES
As regulators turn their attention from hardware to code, we pre-
dict significant challenges.  We focus on three.  First, coders will find
themselves the object of attention of multiple agencies, each espous-
ing inconsistent or flatly contradictory rules or guidance.130  This will
give rise to a “regulatory thicket,” which has the potential to slow the
pace of innovation in some areas.131  Second, regulators will engage in
new forms of turf warfare with other regulators.132  Without statutory
amendment, the boundaries of each agency’s jurisdiction will creep
outward.133  This will exacerbate competition and tension between
agencies that already compete, such as the FCC and FTC, and it will
create new tensions between pairs of agencies that have almost never
before interacted, such as NHTSA and the FTC.134
127 See, e.g., EPA, California Notify Volkswagen of Clean Air Act Violations/Carmaker Al-
legedly Used Software that Circumvents Emissions Testing for Certain Air Pollutants, EPA: VER-
ITY VIEW (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-california-notify-volkswagen-
clean-air-act-violations-carmaker-allegedly-used [https://perma.cc/L2NX-4KBU].
128 EPA, Volkswagen Light Duty Diesel Vehicle Violations for Model Years 2009–2016,
http://www.epa.gov/vw (last updated June 28, 2016) (collecting government documents relating
to violations).
129 See id.
130 See infra Section III.A.
131 See infra Section III.A.
132 See infra Section III.B.
133 See infra text accompanying note 142. R
134 See infra text accompanying notes 143–49. R
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A. The Regulatory Thicket
Carl Shapiro famously described the rise of American patent law
as a “patent thicket, a dense web of overlapping intellectual property
rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually
commercialize new technology.”135  According to Shapiro, this might
mean “stronger patent rights can have the perverse effect of stifling,
not encouraging, innovation.”136
The rise and spread of code regulation suggests that we may be
witnessing the rise of a code regulation “thicket.”  Whether one is cre-
ating software from scratch, improving on another’s code, or merely
using a device that happens to have code running on it, one must
worry about code as never before.
This dynamic is showcased in a number of the examples noted
above.  For example, the tinkerers who seek to replace the operating
systems on their wireless routers may face multiple legal barriers to
doing so.137  Router modifications, for example, may run afoul of FCC
regulations aimed at preventing harmful interference.138  Steps taken
to address the FCC’s rules, however, may themselves require the cir-
cumvention of digital rights management technologies placed on the
router firmware by the manufacturer, exposing the tinkerer to liability
under the DMCA.139
Similarly, security researchers who attempt to probe and identify
vulnerabilities may not only face liability under the CFAA (for acces-
sing computer systems without authorization) and the DMCA (for cir-
cumventing technological protection measures on the systems’
copyrighted computer code), but may be increasingly forced to endure
scrutiny from other agencies, such as the EPA, FDA, or FAA, if their
research strays into computer systems on cars and tractors, medical
devices, or aircraft and drones.140
The analogy is not perfect.  The number of agencies that might be
focused on a particular type of software is unlikely to exceed double
digits, even when state and foreign agencies are considered.  The num-
ber of patents (not to mention patent claims) that might arguably
135 Shapiro, supra note 10, at 120. R
136 Id.
137 See Brodkin, supra note 55. R
138 See id.
139 Cf. Audrey Watters, Sony and “Geohot” Settle PS3 Jailbreak Lawsuit, READWRITE
(Apr. 11, 2011), http://readwrite.com/2011/04/11/sony_and_geohot_settle_ps3_jailbreak_lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/UY5M-RBYC] (discussing settlement of CFAA and DMCA lawsuit between
Sony and creator of replacement firmware for Playstation 3).
140 See supra notes 66–84 and accompanying text. R
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cover a developer may be several orders of magnitude greater.141  Still,
we think the confusion and uncertainty created by agency concerns
over software has a similar impact on developers, as did patent thick-
ets, and that reformatory efforts to clear the path for activities like
security research are likely to face similarly prohibitive difficulties.
And the software regulation thicket is likely to get much worse as
more agencies join in.
B. New Turf Wars
As the targets of regulation face an increasingly tangled thicket of
regulation, regulators are likely to tangle with each other.  As the re-
cent DMCA triennial review underscored, regulators such as the Cop-
yright Office and the DOJ, who have historical dominion over
computer software and mandates to prevent copyright infringement
and computer hacking, are likely to collide with agencies with both
complementary and competing mandates.142
The EPA, for example, may seek to both prevent tinkerers from
modifying vehicles to evade emissions protections through the use of
software protections, while simultaneously relying on the help of inde-
pendent researchers to test the security of those protections, and also
to penetrate them to verify that manufacturers of the underlying
software are complying with emissions protections.  The FDA may
seek to prevent malicious hackers from penetrating the security of
software-enabled medical devices while simultaneously seeking to
provide access to that software to facilitate patient access to stored
data and independent security verification.
Similarly, until the rise of the smartphone, the FTC and FCC ac-
cepted a congressionally mandated detente over privacy policy in this
country.  The FTC embraced a role as the preeminent privacy cop, at
least over commercial actors, while the FCC focused on its relatively
narrow, statutorily provided regulation of Customer Proprietary Net-
work Information (“CPNI”).143  Meanwhile, again by statutory fiat,
the FTC ceded authority over the traditional telecommunications in-
141 Mike Masnick, There Are 250,000 Active Patents That Impact Smartphones; Represent-
ing One in Six Active Patents Today, TECH DIRT: INNOVATION, (Oct. 18, 2012, 8:28 AM), https://
www.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/20121017/10480520734/there-are-250000-active-pat
ents-that-impact-smartphones-representing-one-six-active-patents-today.shtml [https://perma.cc/
UY5M-RBYC].
142 See supra notes 66–84 and accompanying text. R
143 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012).
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dustry because Congress excluded “common carriers” from its section
5 jurisdiction.144
The peace was at least interrupted in 2014’s Open Internet Order
from the FCC.  Through this Order, the FCC reclassified broadband
internet service under Title II of the Telecommunications Act.145
Most importantly for this discussion, this extended the CPNI rules to
new actors, treading somewhat into the area the FTC had called its
regulatory home.146  Privacy watchers anticipated a coming turf war,
particularly once the FCC began bringing large-dollar judgments
against providers for violating the CPNI rules.147
We have yet to see how this particular turf war might play out.
For now, there appears to be a cease-fire.  In late 2015, the FTC and
FCC bureau directors in charge of enforcing their respective privacy
rules entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, laying out a
promise to coexist and cooperate on privacy cases involving providers
of communications services.148
These examples showcase that varying mandates and policy ini-
tiatives will bring regulators to train their sights on computer code in
overlapping and sometimes-conflicting ways.  Interests in sound
cybersecurity policy will run headlong into copyright concerns,149 in-
terests in patient autonomy into health and safety concerns, and inter-
ests in repair and tinkering into environmental and safety concerns.
Moreover, no entity or law currently stands well equipped to
evaluate and mediate these policy concerns.  While the NTIA’s port-
folio theoretically involves harmonizing the administration’s position
on technology-related issues, we believe a more robust set of tools is
necessary.  While this Article does not provide a complete set of these
tools, the next section endeavors to lay a foundation.
C. The Lessons of the CFAA
Whether we embrace a single, omnibus code regulation as a re-
sponse to the thicket, or continue down our current path of creating
144 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
145 In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, ¶ 133
(2015) (Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order).
146 See id. ¶¶ 462, 464, 467.
147 Bracy, supra note 12. R
148 FTC-FCC Consumer Protection Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 13. R
149 Laura Moy, Why Copyright Law Is Undermining Cybersecurity, and How to Fix It, NEW
AM. OPEN TECH. INST.: BLOG (June 30, 2015), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/why-copyright-
law-is-undermining-cybersecurity-and-how-to-fix-it/ [https://perma.cc/6DAS-TX2J].
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new provisions for every context, there is much we can learn from
decades-long experience with the CFAA.150
Perhaps the most important lesson the CFAA teaches is about
the importance of authorization.  As earlier scholarship151 and many
of the works in this Symposium152 demonstrate, those who would reg-
ulate code often create elaborate permissions systems, born in
software and made enforceable through legislation.153  When this is
done well, these systems draw bright lines that delineate the borders
between what is allowed and forbidden.154  When this is not done well,
coders and other actors face uncertainty.155  This uncertainty is only
multiplied in the regulatory thicket, as coders may encounter overlap-
ping or inconsistent expressions of authorization or prohibition.
Professor Ed Felten has experienced the difficulty of doing re-
search on software systems under the “permission” systems created by
the CFAA and DMCA, facing challenges from the copyright industry
directed at stifling his research.156  Many innovative researchers re-
quire close contact with attorneys in order to steer clear of exposure
to liability.157  Lawyers trying to interpret the ambiguities and open
textures of these laws tend to err on the side of caution, providing
conservative advice, meaning much research is narrowed or avoided
altogether.
What Professor Felten has experienced will begin to trickle
outside the rarefied world of computer science research and begin to
touch commercial actors and individual tinkerers in fields that to date
have been untouched by this kind of fear of regulation.  For example,
the FAA has required owners of drones that weigh more than about
one half of a pound to register and mark their drones158 and NHTSA
150 E.g., Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 (2003).
151 See id.
152 E.g., James Grimmelmann, Consenting to Computer Use, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1500
(2016), Josh Goldfoot & Aditya Bamzai, A Trespass Framework for the Crime of Hacking, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477 (2016).
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 See Pam Samuelson, Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science, 293 SCI. 2028, 2028
(2001).
157 E.g., id.
158 Fed. Aviation Admin., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Registration, FAA, http://
www.faa.gov/uas/registration/ [https://perma.cc/H6EW-PDB7] (last modified Sept. 19, 2016,
10:06 AM).
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recommends that car manufacturers hire computer security experts to
protect their connected cars.159
IV. CENTRALIZING CODE REGULATION
One way to ameliorate some of the problems of turf wars and the
looming software regulation thicket is to vest authority for code regu-
lation in a single government agency.  There is a modest role for a
well-designed and properly-authorized entity to help the federal gov-
ernment speak with one voice and to help anticipate and resolve in-
consistencies.  To be clear, we do not think it would be wise to
centralize all authority for all software regulation.  Even once every-
thing has software, there will still be good reason to keep regulatory
power divided roughly along historically relevant boundaries.
The most important reason to centralize some authority will be to
stamp out, or at least recognize, inconsistencies.  Of course, some in-
consistencies are not a problem.  Agencies might interpret the term
“authorization” differently if one is focused on vehicle safety and the
other on copyright, for example.  But if two agencies purporting to
regulate essentially the same thing (for example, the FTC and FCC on
privacy) promulgate inconsistent rules or approaches, the results will
often be undesirable.  In circumstances like these, we might want a
centralized agency that can, at the very least, coordinate between the
agencies and perhaps serve as adjudicator or tiebreaker, the way the
Office of Management and Budget does for executive branch deci-
sions.160  The prospective agency might also serve as a convening
force, bringing together experts from industry, government, the acad-
emy, and public interest groups to debate issues, produce research,
and educate one another.
For inspiration, we could look to similar efforts along these lines,
learning from the roles played in the White House by the Office of
Science and Technology Policy and the Office of Management and
Budget.  We should also consider proposals from scholars, such as a
proposal by Frank Pasquale and Oren Bracha to establish a Federal
159 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., A SUMMARY OF
CYBERSECURITY BEST PRACTICES 26 (Oct. 2014), http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NVS/
Crash%20Avoidance/Technical%20Publications/2014/812075_CybersecurityBestPractices.pdf.
160 The Mission and Structure of the Office of Management and Budget, WHITE HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_mission/ [https://perma.cc/RPG8-LFHY] (last
visited Oct. 3, 2016).
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Search Commission161 and another from Ryan Calo to establish a Fed-
eral Robotics Commission.162
The vision thus far is decidedly top-down: one central agency
serving as the last word on resolving agency conflicts.  We think it is
equally important—if not more important—to spur bottom-up exper-
tise at the same time.  The top-down regulator can help with this goal
too: it can create mandates, incentives, or simply best practice guides,
all encouraging agencies to source and incorporate technical experts
into their employee ranks.
One model might be the FTC, which has in recent years injected
a large and growing number of technologists into the agency, starting
first with five successive Chief Technologists, and including the crea-
tion of a new Office of Technology Research and Investigation.163
A second model is the recently created Federal Privacy Coun-
cil.164  This entity, created by White House Executive Order, has been
charged with helping “Senior Agency Officials for Privacy at agencies
better coordinate and collaborate, educate the Federal workforce, and
exchange best practices.”165  The Executive Order also obligated
agency heads to designate a “Senior Agency Official for Privacy” (in
most cases, a Chief Privacy Officer), if they did not have one already.
We harbor no illusions that the presence of more technical exper-
tise will necessarily solve the thicket problem or avoid agency con-
flicts.  Technical experts might in good faith disagree about a technical
problem based on the vantage point of the agency they represent, the
information they can access, and the type of training and experience
they bring to their positions.  Still, we think technical experts at differ-
ent agencies are likely to agree on core questions about the technol-
ogy itself.  This will isolate for disagreement issues that cannot be
resolved based on understanding the technology alone, which we
think will both narrow and sharpen the set of important issues in a
very productive manner.
161 Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission?  Access, Fairness, and Ac-
countability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1151 (2008).
162 Ryan Calo, The Case for a Federal Robotics Commission, CTR. TECH. INNOVATION
BROOKINGS (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2014/09/case-for-fed-
eral-robotics-commission [https://perma.cc/PGR9-JPTZ].
163 Ashkan Soltani, Booting Up a New Research Office at the FTC, TECH@FTC BLOG
(Mar. 23, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/techftc/2015/03/booting-new-
research-office-ftc [https://perma.cc/J6N4-T58G].
164 Exec. Order No. 13,719, 81 Fed. Reg. 7959 (Feb. 9, 2016).
165 Id. § 4.A.
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CONCLUSION
We used to regulate things, and now we regulate code.  As
software replaces hardware across every industry and in every sphere
of human activity, regulators will realize that they are undertaking
what is, for them, at least, a fundamentally new and foreign type of
activity.  The more insightful and self-aware regulators among them
will recognize that they need to change their approaches, philoso-
phies, and personnel to respond to this change.  The best regulators
will understand that they have lessons to learn from agencies on the
vanguard of code regulation, such as the FTC, FCC, and Register of
Copyrights, with many of those lessons being cautionary tales rather
than best practices.  In the end, we think it is likely that the federal
government will need to centralize at least some authority over code
in a single agency.  If we are careful and a bit lucky, we might be able
to avoid repeating some of the most difficult mistakes of the CFAA
and DMCA.
